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ABSTRACT
Model Stealing (MS) attacks allow an adversary with black-box
access to a Machine Learning model to replicate its functionality,
compromising the confidentiality of the model. Such attacks train a
clone model by using the predictions of the target model for differ-
ent inputs. The effectiveness of such attacks relies heavily on the
availability of data necessary to query the target model. Existing at-
tacks either assume partial access to the dataset of the target model
or availability of an alternate dataset with semantic similarities.
Unfortunately, these attacks fail to produce a high-accuracy clone
without access to the target dataset or a representative dataset.
This paper proposes MAZE – a data-free model stealing attack
using zeroth-order gradient estimation. In contrast to prior works,
MAZE does not require any data and instead creates synthetic data
using a generative model. Inspired by recent works in data-free
Knowledge Distillation (KD), we train the generative model using
a disagreement objective to produce inputs that maximize disagree-
ment between the clone and the target model. However, unlike the
white-box setting of KD, where the gradient information is avail-
able, training a generator for model stealing requires performing
black-box optimization, as it involves accessing the target model
under attack. MAZE relies on zeroth-order gradient estimation to
perform this optimization and enables a highly accurate MS attack.
Our evaluation with four datasets shows that MAZE provides
a normalized clone accuracy in the range of 0.91× to 0.99×, and
outperforms even the recent attacks that rely on partial data (JBDA,
clone accuracy 0.13× to 0.69×) and surrogate data (KnockoffNets,
clone accuracy 0.52× to 0.97×). We also study an extension of
MAZE in the partial-data setting, and develop MAZE-PD, which
generates synthetic data closer to the target distribution. MAZE-PD
further improves the clone accuracy (0.97× to 1.0×) and reduces
the query required for the attack by 2×-24×.
1 INTRODUCTION
Advances in Machine Learning (ML) algorithms such as Deep Neu-
ral Networks (DNNs) have enabled the automation of a wide variety
of challenging tasks in multiple fields, including computer vision
and speech recognition. This, in turn, has enabled companies to
train and deploy DNN models to create new products and services
like intelligent cameras, voice assistants, self-driving cars, and even
improve existing products such as recommendation and predictive
text. Furthermore, several companies currently also offer ML as a
service where a user can query a remotely hosted ML model with
an input to obtain the output predictions. The users of such services
typically only have black-box access to the predictions of the model
without knowing the model parameters or architecture.
As the performance ofMLmodels scaleswith the training data [14],
companies spend a significant amount of money and engineering
resources to collect vast amounts of data to train high-performance
ML models. Protecting the confidentiality of these models is vital
both to maintain a competitive advantage as well as preventing
the stolen model from being misused by an adversary to compro-
mise security and privacy. For example, an adversary can use the
stolen model to craft adversarial examples that can fool the model
using model evasion attacks [12, 35, 37], establish membership of
an individual’s record in the training data through membership
inference attacks [25, 33, 40], and even leak sensitive user data used
to train the model through model inversion [9, 41, 45] attacks. Thus,
ML models are considered valuable intellectual properties and are
closely guarded against theft and data leaks.
Step 1: Construct Training dataset by querying the target model
Step 2: Use the constructed dataset to train the clone model
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Figure 1: Model stealing attacks: The targetmodel is queried
using a set of inputs {xi }ni=1 to obtain a labeled training
dataset {xi ,yi }ni=1, which is used to train the clone model.
Model stealing attacks compromise the confidentiality of ML
models by allowing an adversary to train a clone model that closely
mimics the predictions of the target model, effectively copying its
functionality. These attacks only require black-box access to the
target model where the adversary can access the predictions of
the model for any given input. We explain MS attacks using Fig. 1.
The adversary first queries the target model T with various inputs
{xi }ni=1 and uses the predictions of the target model yi = T (xi )
to construct a labeled dataset D = {xi ,yi }. This dataset is used
to train a clone model C to match the predictions of T . With an
appropriate set of inputs {xi }ni=1, this process can be used to train a
clone model that achieves high accuracy on the classification task,
effectively replicating the functionality of the target model.
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In existing MS attacks, the availability of data necessary to query
the target model plays a key role in the ability of the attacker
to train high accuracy clone models. For example, if the inputs
from the entire training dataset of T is available to the adversary,
then the attacker can simply use the predictions of T on these
inputs to construct a labeled training dataset, which can be used to
train a highly accurate clone model. However, in most real-world
scenarios, the training data is not readily available to the attacker as
companies typically train their models using proprietary datasets.
Recently, several MS attacks have been proposed for the setting
where only surrogate data or a subset of the training data is available
to the adversary. For example, Jacobian-Based Dataset Augmentation
(JBDA) [30] is an attack that uses a subset of the training data to
create additional synthetic data and uses that to query the target
model. Similarly, KnockoffNets [28] is another MS attack that uses
a surrogate dataset to query the target model. The efficacy of this
attack depends on the availability of a surrogate dataset that is
representative of the training data (e.g., using CIFAR-100 to attack
a CIFAR-10 model). Thus, existing attacks either assume partial
access to the dataset of the target mode or availability of a suitable
surrogate dataset. Unfortunately, these attacks become ineffective
without access to the target dataset or representative dataset. The
goal of our paper is to develop a highly accurate MS attack without
relying on any access to the target dataset or a surrogate dataset.
We proposeMAZE, a data-freemodel stealing attack using zeroth-
order (ZO) gradient estimation. Unlike existing attacks, MAZE
does not require access to the target or a surrogate dataset and
instead uses a generative model to produce the synthetic inputs for
launching the attack. The generator is trained on a disagreement
objective, wherein the generator is trained to produce inputs that
maximize the disagreement between the predictions of the teacher
(target model) and the student (clone model). Similar objectives
have been used by recent work on data-free Knowledge Distillation
(KD) [24, 41]. But, unlike the work on data-free KD, which assumes
white-box access to the teacher model, MAZE operates in a black-
box setting where no such access is available. Our key insight
in MAZE is to use the zeroth-order gradient estimate [10, 26] to
approximate the gradient of the black-box target model and use
this to train the generator. Unfortunately, the dimensionality of the
generator’s parameters can be in the order of millions, making a
direct application of ZO gradient estimation challenging. So, instead
we show how to estimate the gradient with respect to the lower
dimensional synthetic input and use that to train the generator in
a query-efficient manner.
We evaluate our proposal on image classification DNNs across
multiple datasets, including FashionMNIST, SVHN, GTSRB, and
CIFAR-10. Our evaluation shows that MAZE provides a normalized
clone accuracy1 of 0.91× to 0.99×. In fact, MAZE, even though it
does not use any data inputs, outperforms the recent attacks that
rely on partial data (JBDA, clone accuracy of 0.13× to 0.69×) or
surrogate data (KnockoffNets, clone accuracy of 0.52× to 0.97×).
Thus, MAZE not only allows the attacker to launch the attack in a
data-free setting but also have higher accuracy for the attack.
1Normalized clone accuracy expresses the accuracy of the clone model as a fraction of
the target-model accuracy
Table 1: Comparison with prior works in Knowledge Dis-
tillation (KD) and model stealing attacks. MAZE enables
data-free model stealing with black-box access to the target
model. MAZE-PD extends MAZE to the partial-data setting.
White-Box Black-Box
Data KD (full-data)
KD (full-data)
KnockoffNets (surrogate data)
JBDA (partial data)
MAZE-PD (partial data)
No Data Data-Free KD MAZE
While we develop MAZE primarily for the data-free setting, we
also propose an extension of MAZE, calledMAZE-PD, for scenarios
where a small partial dataset (e.g., 100 examples) is available to the
attacker. MAZE-PD leverages the available data to produce queries
that are closer to the training distribution than in MAZE by using
generative adversarial training. Our evaluations show that MAZE-
PD provides near-perfect clone accuracy (0.97× to 1.0×) while
reducing the number of queries by 2×-24× compared to MAZE.
Like MAZE, MAZE-PD also significantly outperforms existing state-
of-the-art model stealing methods such as KnockoffNets [28] and
JBDA [30] that also rely on partial datasets.
Table 1 contrasts MAZE against KD and other MS attacks. KD
is typically used to train a student model from a teacher model
when the training dataset is available. Recent works on data-free
KD [3, 8, 15, 24, 41, 42] have shown that it is possible to perform
KD without knowledge of the training data, however, they require
white-box access to the teacher model. Model stealing attacks, on
the other hand, aim to copy a target model in the black-box set-
ting, but assume the availability of a representative dataset. MAZE
requires neither white-box access to a model nor any dataset. It
only requires black-box access to the probabilistic predictions of
the target model. While prior works [32, 36] have investigated
model stealing with noise-like inputs for simple models, such at-
tacks become ineffective for complex models and datasets (e.g., our
evaluations show a clone accuracy of only 0.10× for CIFAR-10 and
0.19× for GTSRB). To the best of our knowledge, MAZE is the first
data-free model stealing attack that provides high accuracy across
multiple image classification datasets and complex DNN models, such
as Resnet [16]. MAZE-PD extends MAZE to the partial-data setting
to further improve accuracy and reduce the query budget.
Overall our paper makes the following key contributions:
(1) We propose MAZE, a highly accurate model stealing attack
that does not require any data. MAZE uses a generative
model trained with a disagreement objective using zeroth-
order gradient estimation to generate the inputs. Even
though MAZE does not use any data, it still outperforms
recent attacks that rely on partial data or surrogate data.
(2) We propose MAZE-PD for the partial-data setting, where
a small subset of training data (e.g. 100 examples) is avail-
able. MAZE-PD trains the generator to produce inputs that
are closer to the target data distribution. This improves
the quality of synthetic data and results in even higher
accuracy and a reduced number of queries for the attack.
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2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The objective ofModel Stealing (MS) attacks is to train a clonemodel
that replicates the functionality of a target model and achieves high
accuracy on the task of the target model. As the attacker typically
does not have access to the dataset used to train the target model,
attacks need alternate forms of data to query the target model and
perform model stealing. Depending on the availability of data, MS
attacks can broadly be classified into three categories: (1) partial-
data, (2) surrogate-data, and (3) data-free. We provide background
on these attack settings and provide examples of recent attacks in
each case. We also discuss the limitations of the existing attacks
and motivate the need for our attack. Lastly, we formally state the
goal and threat model for our attack.
2.1 Model Stealing with Partial Data
In the partial-data setting, the attacker has access to a subset of
the data used to train the target model. While this in itself may be
insufficient to carry out model stealing, it allows the attacker to
craft synthetic examples using the available data. Jacobian Based
Dataset Augmentation (JBDA) [30] is an example of one such attack
that assumes that the adversary has access to a small set of seed
examples from the target data distribution. The attack works by
first training a clone model C using the seed examples and then
progressively adding synthetic examples to the training dataset.
JBDA uses a perturbation based heuristic to generate new synthetic
inputs from existing labeled inputs. E.g., from an input-label pair
(x ,y), a synthetic input x ′ is generated by using the jacobian of the
clone model’s loss function ∇xL (C (x ;θc ) ,y) as shown in Eqn. 1.
x ′ = x + λsiдn (∇xL (C (x ;θc ) ,y)) (1)
The dataset of synthetic examples {x ′i } generated this way are
labeled by using the predictions of the target model y′i = T (x ′i )
and the labeled examples {x ′i ,y′i } are added to the pool of labeled
examples that can be used to train the clone model C . In addition
to requiring a set of seed examples from the target distribution,
a key limitation of JBDA is that, while it works well for simpler
datasets like MNIST, it tends to produce clone models with lower
classification accuracy for more complex datasets. For example, our
evaluations show that JBDA provides a relative clone accuracy of
only 0.13× (GTSRB dataset) and 0.18× (SVHN dataset).
2.2 Model Stealing with Surrogate Data
In the surrogate data setting, the attacker has access to alternate
datasets that can be used to query the target model. For example,
consider an attacker who wants to steal a DNN model trained with
the CIFAR-10 dataset. Given a lack of access to a large collection of
examples from CIFAR-10, the attacker can potentially use images
from an alternate dataset, such as CIFAR-100 to query the target
model to perform model stealing. KnockoffNets [28] is an example
of a MS attack that is designed to operate in such a setting. With a
suitable surrogate dataset, KnockoffNets can produce clone models
with up to 0.97× the accuracy of the target model. However, the
efficacy of such attacks is dictated by the availability of a suitable
surrogate dataset. For instance, if we use the MNIST dataset to
performModel stealing on a FashionMNIST model, it only produces
a clone model with 0.41× the accuracy of the target model. This
is because the surrogate dataset is not representative of the target
dataset, which reduces the effectiveness of the attack.
2.3 Data-Free Model Stealing
In the data-free setting, the adversary does not have access to any
data. This represents the hardest setting to carry out MS as the
attacker has no knowledge of the data distribution used to train the
target model. A recent work by Roberts et al. [32] studies the use of
inputs derived from various noise distributions to carry out model
stealing attack in the data-free setting. The authors show that it is
possible to carry out MS attacks with relatively good accuracy for
simple datasets like MNIST just using inputs sampled from noise
distributions. However, our evaluations show that such attacks do
not scale to more complex datasets such as CIFAR-10 (we obtained
relative clone accuracy of only 0.11×), limiting their applicability.
Another attack by Tramer et al. [36] attempts to extract the exact
model parameters of a black-box target model. The authors ap-
ply equation-solving, using the response of the model for various
random queries, to deduce the exact values of the model parame-
ters. This work assumes partial knowledge of the target model like
the number of neurons and their connectivity. Unfortunately, this
technique was only shown to work on simple single-layer neural
networks with 20 neurons.
2.4 Our Goal
Existing attacks in the partial-data and data-free settings only seem
to be effective for small models trained on simple datasets. Our goal
is to develop an attack that can be used to train a highly accurate
clone model in the data-free setting only using black-box access to
the target model. We formally state the objective and constraints
of our proposed model stealing attack.
Attack Objective: Consider a target model T (x ;θT ) that per-
forms a classification task with high accuracy on inputs x sampled
from a target distribution PT . Our goal is to train a clone model
C(x ;θC ) that replicates the functionality of T and achieves high
accuracy on the classification task as shown by Eqn. 2
max
θC
E
x∼PT
[Acc(C(x ;θC ))] (2)
Threat Model: In this work, we assume that the adversary does
not know any details about the Target model’s architecture or the
model parameters θT . The adversary is only allowed black-box
access to the target model. We assume the soft-label setting where
the adversary can query the target model with any input x and
observe its output probabilities ®y = T (x ;θT ). We consider model
stealing attacks under two settings based on the availability of data:
1. Data-free setting (Primary goal): The adversary does not have
access to the dataset DT used to train the target model or a good
way to sample from the target data distribution PT . (Section 3)
2. Partial-data setting (Secondary goal): The adversary has access
to a small subset (e.g., 100) of training examples randomly sampled
from the training dataset of the target model. (Section 5)
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Clone Model (C)
Target Model (T )
Generator (G)
x LG LC
x = G(z)
yT = T (x)
yC = C(x)
LG = −DKL (yT , yC)
LC = DKL (yT , yC)
Forward propagation
Backprop for Generator Update
Backprop for Clone Update
z ∼ N (0, I)
Figure 2: MAZE Attack Setup: MAZE uses a generative model G to produce the synthetic input queries {x} to perform Model
Stealing. The clone model C is trained to match the predictions of the target model T . G is trained to produce queries that
maximize the dissimilarity between yT and yC . Optimizing LG requires backpropagation throughT to updateG. However, we
only have black-box access to T , therefore we use zeroth-order gradient estimation to perform gradient descent on LG .
3 MAZE: DATA-FREE MODEL STEALING
We proposeMAZE, a data-free model stealing attack using zeroth
order gradient estimation. Unlike existing attacks, MAZE does not
require access to the target or a surrogate dataset and instead uses a
generative model to produce the synthetic queries for launching the
attack. Figure 2 shows an overview of MAZE. MAZE trains a clone
model C using the predictions of T for various input queries {x}.
MAZE uses a generative modelG to produce the inputs necessary to
query the target model. In this section, we first describe the training
objectives of the clone and the generator model. We then motivate
the need for gradient estimation to updateG in the black-box setting
of MS attack and show how zeroth-order gradient estimation can be
used to optimize the parameters ofG and enable our attack. Finally,
we discuss our algorithm to carry out model stealing with MAZE.
3.1 Training the Clone Model
The clone model is trained on the input queries produced by the
generator. The generator G takes in a low dimensional latent vec-
tor z, sampled from a random normal distribution, and produces
an input query x ∈ Rd that matches the input dimension of the
target classifier (Eqn. 3). We use x to queryT and obtain the output
probabilities of the target model ®yT (Eqn. 4). Similarly, we obtain
the predictions of the clone model ®yC on x as shown by Eqn. 5.
x = G(z;θG ); z ∼ N(0, I ) (3)
®yT = T (x ;θT ) (4)
®yC = C(x ;θC ) (5)
Where θT , θC and θG represent the parameters of the target,
clone, and generator models, respectively. The parameters of the
clone model θC are updated using the loss function in Eqn. 6 to
minimize the KL divergence between ®yC and ®yT .
LC = DKL( ®yT ∥ ®yC ) (6)
3.2 Training the Generator Model
The generator modelG plays the role of synthesizing the queries
necessary to perform model stealing. Similar to recent works in
data-free KD [8, 24, 41], MAZE trains the generator to produce
queries that maximize the disagreement between the predictions
of the teacher and the student by maximizing the KL-divergence
between ®yT and ®yC . The loss function used to update the model
parameters of the generator θG is described by Eqn. 7, which we
refer to as the disagreement objective.
LG = −DKL( ®yT ∥ ®yC ) (7)
Training G on this loss function maximizes the disagreement be-
tween the predictions of the target and the clone model. Since C
and G have opposing objectives, training both models together
results in a two-player game, similar to Generative Adversarial Net-
works [11], resulting in the generation of inputs that maximize the
learning of the clone model. By trainingC to match the predictions
of T on the queries generated by G, we can perform knowledge
distillation and obtain a highly accurate clone model.
TrainingG using the loss function in Eqn. 7 requires backpropa-
gating through the predictions of the target model T , as shown by
the dashed lines in Figure 2 and Eqn. 4, 5. Unfortunately, as we only
have black-box access to T , we cannot perform back-propagation
directly, preventing us from training G and carrying out the attack.
To solve this problem, our insight is to use zeroth-order gradient
estimation to approximate the gradient of the loss function LG .
The number of black-box queries necessary for ZO gradient es-
timation scales with the dimensionality of the parameters being
optimized. Estimating the gradients of LG with respect to the gen-
erator parameters θG directly is expensive as the generator has on
the order of millions of parameters. Instead, we choose to estimate
the gradients with respect to the synthetic input x produced by the
generator, which has a much lower dimensionality (3072 for CIFAR-
10), and use this estimate to back propagate throughG (Eqn. 9). This
modification allows us to compute a gradient estimates in a query
efficient manner to update the generator model. The following
section describes how we efficiently apply zeroth-order gradient
estimation to train the generator model.
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3.3 Train via Zeroth-Order Gradient Estimate
Zeroth-order gradient estimation [10, 26] is a popular technique
to perform optimization in the black-box setting. We use this tech-
nique to train our generator modelG . Recall that our objective is to
update the generator model parameters θG using gradient descent
to minimize the loss function LG as shown in Eqn. 8.
θ t+1G = θ
t
G − η∇θGLG (8)
Updating θG in this way requires us to compute the derivative
of the loss function ∇θGLG . By the use of chain-rule, ∇θGLG can
be decomposed into two components as shown in Eqn. 9.
∇θGLG =
∂LG
∂θG
=
∂LG
∂x
× ∂x
∂θG
(9)
We can compute the second term ∂x
∂θG
in Eqn. 9 by perform-
ing backpropagation through G. Computing the first term ∂LG∂x
however requires access to the model parameters of the target
model (θT ). Since T is a black-box model from the perspective of
the attacker, we do not have access to θT , which prevents us from
computing ∂LG∂x through backpropagation. Instead, we propose to
use an approximation of the gradient by leveraging zeroth-order
gradient estimation. To explain how the gradient estimate is com-
puted, consider an input vector x ∈ Rd generated byG that is used
to query T . We can estimate ∂LG∂x by using the method of forward
differences [31] as shown in Eqn. 10.
∇ˆxLG (x ;ui ) = d · (LG (x + ϵui ) − LG (x))
ϵ
ui (10)
Where ui is a random variable drawn from a d dimensional unit
sphere with uniform probability and ϵ is a small positive constant
called the smoothing factor. The random gradient estimate, shown
in Eqn. 10, tends to have a high variance. To reduce the variance,
we use an averaged version of the random gradient estimate [7, 22]
by computing the forward difference usingm random directions
{u1,u2, ..um }, as shown in Eqn. 11.
∇ˆxLG (x) = 1
m
m∑
i=1
∇ˆxLG (x ;ui ) (11)
Where ∇ˆxLG is an estimate of the true gradient ∇xLG . By sub-
stituting ∇ˆxLG into Eqn. 9, we can compute an approximation for
the gradient of the loss function of the generator: ∇ˆθGLG . The
gradient estimate ∇ˆθGLG computed this way can be used to per-
form gradient descent by updating the parameters of the generator
model θG according to Eqn. 8. By updating θG , we can trainG to
produce the synthetic examples required to perform model stealing.
One problem that arises with numerical approximation of gradi-
ents as described above is that we need to ensure that the inputs
used to query the target model should have values that lie within the
valid range, in our case [−1, 1]. However, the perturbation (x + ϵui )
might cause the input to take values outside this range, making the
query invalid. To avoid this problem, we apply the gradient estima-
tion to the activations xp in the penultimate layer ofG , which does
not have a constraint on the values it can take. Note that the last
layer of G consists of a tanh function that ensures that the output
of the generator x = tanh(xp ) is always in the range [−1, 1].
3.4 MAZE Algorithm for Model Stealing Attack
We outline the algorithm of MAZE in Algorithm 1 by putting to-
gether the individual training algorithms of the generator and clone
models. We start by fixing a query budget Q , which dictates the
maximum number of queries we are allowed to make to the target
model T . ϵ is the smoothing parameter and m is the number of
random directions used to estimate the gradient. We set the value
of ϵ to 0.001 in our experiments. NG ,NC represent the number of
training iterations and ηG ,ηC represent the learning rates of the
generator and clone model, respectively. NR denotes the number
of iterations for experience replay.
Our attack starts by initializing the generator and the clone
model G(·;θG ),C(·;θC ). q is a variable that holds the number of
queries already performed and D is a dataset used to collect the
input, label pairs: (x ,T (x)) generated by querying the target model.
Algorithm 1:MAZE Algorithm for Model Stealing Attack
Input: T ,Q, ϵ,m,NG ,NC ,NG ,ηG ,ηC
Output: Clone model C(·;θC )
Initialize G(·;θG ),C(·;θC ),q ← 0,D ← {}
while q < Q do
// Generator Training
for i ← 0 to NG do
x = G(z) : z ∼ N(0, I )
LG = −DKL (T (x)∥C(x))
∇ˆθGLG ← ZO_дrad_est(G,T ,C,x , ϵ,m)
θG ← θG − ηG ∇ˆθGLG
end
// Clone Training
for i ← 0 to NC do
x = G(z) : z ∼ N(0, I )
LC = DKL (T (x)∥C(x))
θC ← θC − ηC∇θCLC
D ← D ∪ {(x ,T (x))}
end
// Experience Replay
for i ← 0 to NT do
(x ,yT ) ∼ D
LC = DKL (yT ∥C(x))
θC ← θC − ηC∇θCLC
end
q ← update(q)
end
The outermost loop of the attack repeats till we exhaust our
query budget Q . The attack algorithm involves three phases: 1.
Generator Training 2. Clone Training and 3. Experience Replay. In
the Generator Training phase, we perform NG rounds of gradient
descent for the generator model G, which is trained to produce
inputs x that maximize the KL-divergence between the predictions
of the target and clone model. The parameters of the generator θG
are updated by using zeroth-order gradient estimates as described
in Section 3.3. This is followed by the Clone Training phase where
we perform NC rounds of gradient descent for C . In each round,
we generate a batch of inputs x = G(z) and use these inputs to
query the target model. The clone model is trained to match the
5
predictions of the target model byminimizingDKL(T (x)∥C(x)). The
input, prediction pair: (x ,T (x)) generated in each round is stored in
dataset D. Finally, we perform Experience Replay, where we train
the clone on previously seen inputs that are stored inD. Retraining
on previously seen queries reduces catastrophic forgetting [23] and
ensures that the clone model continues to classify old examples
seen during the earlier part of the training process correctly.
3.5 Computing the Query Cost
The target model needs to be queried in order to update both the
generator and the clone models. Considering a batch size of 1, one
training iteration of G requiresm + 1 queries to T for the zeroth-
order gradient estimation and each training loop of C requires 1
query. Experience replay, on the other hand, does not require any
additional queries to T . Thus, with a batch size of B, the query cost
of each iteration is described by Eqn. 12
Query cost per iteration = B(NG (m + 1) + NC ) (12)
We use B = 128, NG = 1,NC = 5,NR = 10 andm = 10 in our
experiments, unless stated otherwise. Thus, each iteration of the
attack requires 2048 queries. Unless specified otherwise, MAZE is
evaluated with a default query budget of 30 million queries.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We validate our attack by performing model stealing attacks on
various target models and provide experimental evidence to show
that our attack can produce high accuracy clone models without
using any data. We first describe our experimental setup followed
by the results of our proposed model stealing attack on various
target datasets. We compare our results against two prior works–
KnockoffNets and Jacobian Based Dataset Augmentation (JBDA)–
and show that the clone models produced by our attack have com-
parable or better accuracy than the ones produced by these attacks,
despite not using any data. Additionally, we perform sensitivity
studies to understand how the efficacy of our attack depends on the
query budget and the number of gradient estimation directions (m)
used in our attack. Finally, to understand the limitation of gradient
estimation, we repeat our attack under a setting where we assume
we have access to perfect gradient information through the target
model. This provides an upper bound to the clone model accuracy
that can be obtained when we have perfect gradient information
instead of using a zeroth-order estimate.
4.1 Setup: Dataset and Architecture
We evaluate our attack by performing model stealing using MAZE
to replicate the functionality of Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) trained to perform classification tasks on various image
datasets. Table 2 lists the model architectures and datasets that we
use as the target model T . FashionMNIST [39] is a classification
problem involving 28 × 28 grayscale images while the remaining
datasets use 32 × 32 RGB images. FashionMNIST, SVHN [27], and
CIFAR-10 [20] have 10 classes while GTSRB [34] has 43. With the
exception of CIFAR-10, all the target models are trained for 50
epochs with Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001. We train
the CIFAR-10 target model for 200 epochs using SGD optimizer and
cosine annealing with an initial learning rate of 0.1. We assume
no knowledge of the target model and use a randomly initialized
22-layer Wide Residual Network [44] model as the clone model for
all the datasets. In general, any sufficiently complex DNN can be
used as the clone model. We use Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
to train our clone model with an initial learning rate of 0.1. For
G, we use a generative model with 3 convolutional layers. Each
convolutional layer in G is followed by a batchnorm layer and the
activations are upsampled to ensure that the outputs generated by
G are of the correct dimensionality corresponding to the dataset
being attacked. We use an SGD optimizer with an initial learning
rate of 0.0001 to train G. The learning rates for both the clone and
generator models are decayed using cosine annealing.
Table 2: Dataset, model architecture, and accuracy of the tar-
get models T used in our experiments.
Dataset Target DNN Arch. (T ) Accuracy(%)
FashionMNIST LeNet 91.04
SVHN ResNet-20 95.25
GTSRB ResNet-20 97.43
CIFAR-10 ResNet-20 92.26
4.2 Configuration of Existing Attacks
Existing MS attacks either use surrogate data or synthetic datasets
derived from partial access to the target dataset. We compare MAZE
with the following attacks:
1. KnockoffNets [28]: This attack uses a surrogate dataset to query
the target model to construct a labeled dataset using the predictions
of the target model. This labeled dataset is used to train the clone
model. We evaluate this attack for all the target models listed in
Table 2. We use MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and CIFAR10 as the
surrogate datasets for FashionMNIST, SVHN, CIFAR10, and GTSRB
models, respectively. In each case, we query the target model with
the training examples of the surrogate dataset. We then use the
dataset constructed from these queries to train the clone model for
100 epochs using an SGD optimizer with a learning rate of 0.1 with
cosine annealing scheduler.
2. JBDA [30]: The JBDA attack uses synthetic datasets to query
the target model to perform model stealing. These synthetic exam-
ples are generated by adding perturbations to a set of seed examples,
which are obtained from the data distribution of the target model.
The perturbations are computed by using the Jacobian of the loss
function of the clone model, as shown in Eqn. 1. We start with an
initial dataset of 100 seed examples. We perform 6 rounds2 of syn-
thetic data augmentation and train the clone model for 10 epochs
between each round. λ in Eqn. 1 dictates the magnitude of the per-
turbation. We set this to a value of 0.1. We use Adam optimizer
with a learning rate of 0.001 to train the clone model for JBDA.
3. Noise: To test if inputs sampled from noise can be used to
carry out MS attack, we design a Noise attack. Here, the inputs
that are used to query the target model are derived from a uniform
distribution i.e., x ∼ Ud [−1, 1]. This is similar, in spirit, to the
proposal by Roberts et al. [32] and serves as a baseline data-free
MS attack to compare with our proposal.
2We found that improvement in accuracy stagnates beyond 6 augmentation rounds
for the JBDA attack. This is in line with the observations made by Juuti et al. [18].
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Table 3: Comparison of clone accuracies obtained from various attacks. Numbers in the bracket express the accuracy as a
multiple of the target model accuracy. MAZE obtains high accuracy (0.91× to 0.99×), despite not using any data.
Dataset Target MAZE KnockoffNets JBDA Noise
Accuracy (%) (data-free) (surrogate data) (partial-data) (data-free)
FashionMNIST 91.04 82.9 (0.91×) 47.26 (0.52×) 62.65 (0.69×) 37.59 (0.41×)
SVHN 95.25 94.32(0.99×) 92.77 (0.97×) 17.16(0.18×) 77.68 (0.82×)
GTSRB 97.43 88.31 (0.91×) 89.86 (0.92×) 12.80(0.13×) 18.61 (0.19×)
CIFAR-10 92.26 89.85 (0.97×) 82.56 (0.89×) 25.11 (0.27×) 10.00 (0.11×)
4.3 Key Result: Normalized Clone Accuracy
Table 3 shows the accuracy of the clones obtained by attacking
various target models using MAZE. The numbers in brackets ex-
press the clone accuracy normalized to the accuracy of the target
model being attacked. We also compare our results with three other
model stealing attacks–KnockoffNets, JBDA, and Noise. The best
clone accuracy we obtain from each dataset is highlighted in bold.
Our results show that MAZE produces high accuracy clone mod-
els with a normalized accuracy greater than 0.90× for all the target
models under attack. In contrast, the baseline Noise attack fails
to produce high accuracy clone models for most of the datasets.
Furthermore, the results from our attack also compare favorably
against KnockoffNets and JBDA, both of which require access to
some data. We find that the effectiveness of KnockoffNets is highly
dependent on the surrogate data being used to query the target
model. For example, using MNIST to attack FashionMNIST dataset
results in a low accuracy clone model (0.52× target accuracy) as
these datasets as visually dissimilar. However, using CIFAR-100 to
query CIFAR-10 results in a high accuracy clonemodel (0.89× target
accuracy) due to the similarities in the two datasets. JBDA seems to
be effective for attacking simpler datasets like FashionMNIST , but
the accuracy reduces when attacking more complex datasets. This
is in part because JBDA produces queries that are highly correlated
to the initial set of “seed" examples, which sometimes results in
worse performance even compared to noise (e.g. SVHN). By using
the disagreement objective to train the generator, MAZE can gen-
erate queries that are more useful in training the clone model and
result in higher accuracy of clones (0.91×-0.99×) compared to other
attacks like JBDA (0.13×-0.69×) that use synthetic data.
We study the sensitivity of MAZE to two attack parameters: 1.
Query budget (Q) and 2. Number of gradient estimation directions
(m). We perform experiments by varying these parameters and
study the dependence of the clone model accuracy obtained from
our attack to these parameter values.
4.4 Sensitivity to Query Budget
A larger query budget allows the attacker to carry out more attack
iterations and train a better clone model. To understand the depen-
dence of query budget Q to clone accuracy, we perform sensitivity
studies by carrying out our attack for seven different values ofQ for
each dataset.We setQ ∈ {0.625M, 1.25M, 2.5M, 5M, 10M, 20M, 30M}
and report the normalized clone accuracy for each dataset in Fig 3.
As expected, we find that the clone accuracy increases with an
increase in Q . Additionally, we note that the number of queries
necessary to reach a given clone accuracy seems to scale with the
dimensionality of the input and the difficulty of the target classifica-
tion task. While we use a large query budget of Q = 30M to report
the clone accuracy in Table 3, not all datasets require such a high
query budget to reach the desired level of accuracy. For example, we
only require around 5M queries to reach a normalized accuracy of
0.95× for SVHN, whereas for CIFAR-10, which is a harder dataset to
classify, we require around 30M queries to reach the same accuracy.
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Figure 3: Normalized clone accuracy versusQuery budget (Q)
for various target models under MAZE attack. Clone accu-
racy improves with a higher query budget.
4.5 Sensitivity to Number of Directions for
Estimating the Gradient
Our attack uses a generative model to synthesize the queries neces-
sary to perform model stealing. The loss function of the generator
LG involves the evaluation of a black-box model T . As gradient
information is unavailable, our attack uses zeroth-order gradient
estimation instead to approximate the gradient of the loss function
∇ˆθGLG required to update the generator parameters θG . The esti-
mation error of this zeroth-order approximation is inversely related
to the number of gradient estimation directions (m) used in our
numerical approximation of the gradient (Eqn. 8). By using a larger
value ofm, we can get a more accurate estimate of the gradient.
Unfortunately, increasingm also increases the queries that need to
be made to the target model as described by Eqn. 12. This means
that given a fixed query budget Q , increasing m results in more
queries being consumed to updateG , leaving fewer queries to train
the clone model. To understand this trade-off, we fix the query
budget and perform our attack by settingm to four different values
(m ∈ {1, 5, 10, 20}). With a large query budget of 30M , changing
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m has limited impact as most clone models achieve high accuracy
regardless of the value used form. Hence, for this analysis, we use
smaller query budgets instead to magnify the impact ofm on the
clone accuracy. We set the query budget Q to 1.25M for Fashion-
MNIST and SVHN, 10M for GTSRB, and 20M for CIFAR-10. The
normalized accuracy of clones obtained for these different values
ofm on various datasets are shown in Fig. 4.
Figure 4: Normalized clone accuracy versus number of gra-
dient directions (m) used in MAZE. Increasingm results in a
lower gradient estimation error, but consumesmore queries
to update G, leaving fewer queries to train the clone model.
Our results show that for FashionMNIST and SVHN, lowering
the value ofm results in an improvement in clone accuracy. Setting
m to a smaller value allows more queries to be used to train the
clone model, while sacrificing the accuracy of the gradient update
of the generator. This seems to be a favorable trade-off for simpler
datasets. Similarly, for GTSRB we find that reducing the number of
directions fromm = 20 tom = 5 improves clone accuracy. However,
reducing it further to m = 1 leads to a degradation in the clone
accuracy. We observe a similar trend for CIFAR-10 as well. While
reducingm from 20 to 10 improves accuracy, reducing it further
causes a degradation. This degradation in accuracy by reducingm
for GTSRB and CIFAR-10 can be attributed to the increased error
in gradient estimation with fewer gradient estimation directions.
Thus, in a query limited setting, varying m provides a trade-off
between the number of queries used to update the generatorG and
clone model C . The optimal value ofm to perform model stealing
depends on the complexity of the target dataset being attacked.
4.6 Importance of Experience Replay
For training, MAZE uses experience replay, in which the clonemodel
is retrained on previously seen examples throughout the course
of the attack. This is necessary to avoid catastrophic forgetting,
wherein the clone model performs poorly on examples from the
earlier part of the training process. Additionally, it also ensures that
the generator does not produce redundant examples that are similar
to the ones seen in the earlier part of the training. To understand
the importance of experience replay, we carry out two versions of
the attack: one with experience replay and the other without, and
compare the accuracy of the respective clone models. The results
of this study are shown in Fig. 5. Our results show that on average,
experience replay improves the accuracy of the clone model by 7.3%.
Thus, experience replay is an important component of MAZE.
Figure 5: Impact of Experience Replay on MAZE. On average,
Experience Replay improves clone accuracy by 7.3%.
4.7 Impact of Error in Gradient Estimation
MAZEuses numericalmethods to approximate the gradient through
the black-box target model T to update the parameters of the gen-
erator model. To understand how the gradient estimation error
impacts the accuracy of the clone model, we repeat MAZE by as-
suming that we have access to perfect gradient information. For the
purpose of analysis in this section only, we obtained perfect gradi-
ent information by treating the target T as a white-box model that
allows back-propagation in the Generator Training phase shown in
Algorithm 1. By comparing the results of our attack with the accu-
racy of the clone model trained with perfect gradient information,
we can understand how the gradient estimation error impacts the
accuracy of the clone model obtained from our attack.
Figure 6 shows the clone accuracy of MAZE with zeroth-order
gradient estimation and MAZE with perfect gradient information.
We use a reduced query budget of 1.25M for FashionMNIST and
SVHN, 10M for GTSRB, and 20M for CIFAR-10. We observe that
there is a slight improvement in clone accuracy (on average, 3.8%)
when perfect gradient information is available. This shows that
our approximation of gradient is reasonably accurate and therefore
MAZE is able to train clone model with high accuracy.
When the query budget is increased, the error in estimating the
gradient is tolerated by the training algorithm, and we observe that
at the default budget of 30 million queries the difference in clone
accuracy with estimated gradient and perfect gradient is negligible.
Figure 6: Impact of gradient estimation error by comparing
clone accuracy of MAZE and MAZE with perfect gradient
information. On average, MAZE suffers a 3.8% accuracy loss
due to error in estimating the gradient.
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5 MAZE-PD: MAZE WITH PARTIAL-DATA
Thus far, we have described our model stealing attack in a data-
free setting, where the adversary does not have access to any dataset.
The accuracy and speed of our attack can be further increased if
there are a few examples available from the training-data distri-
bution of the target model. In this section, we consider such a
partial-data setting and develop MAZE-PD, an extension of MAZE
to the partial-data setting.
MAZE-PD uses an organization similar to MAZE, where a gener-
ator model is trained to create synthetic data. However, MAZE-PD
uses Waserstein Generative Adversarial Networks (WGANs) [2] to
train the generator in order to improve the quality of images gen-
erated. In the data-free setting of MAZE,G is trained on a disagree-
ment objective to produce inputs that maximize the disagreement
between the target and the clone model. In the presence of a limited
amount of data, we can additionally train the generator to produce
inputs that are closer to the target distribution by using the WGAN
training objective.
We observe that even a small amount of data from the target
distribution (100 examples) can enable the generator to produce
synthetic inputs that are closer to the target distribution. By im-
proving the quality of the generated queries, MAZE-PD not only
improves the effectiveness of the attack but also allows the attack
to succeed with far fewer queries compared to MAZE.
In this section, we first provide background on WGANs, which
can be used to generate synthetic examples closer to the target
distribution. Following this, we describe how WGANs can be incor-
porated into the training of the generator model of our attack to
develop MAZE-PD. Finally, we provide empirical evidence to show
that MAZE-PD improves clone accuracy and reduces query cost
significantly compared to MAZE.
5.1 Background on WGAN
WGANs can be used to train a generative model to produce syn-
thetic examples from a target distribution PT using a small set of
examples {xi }ni=1 sampled from this distribution. To explain the
training process, we consider a generative model G parameterized
by θG , which produces samples x = G(z;θG ) where z ∼ N(0, I ).
Let PG be the probability distribution of the examples x generated
by G. WGAN aims to minimize theWasserstein Distance between
the generator distribution PG and the target distribution PT by
optimizing over the generator parameter θG . The expression for
the Wasserstein Distance between PT and PG is given by Eqn 13.
W
(
Pt ,Pд
)
= inf
γ ∈Π(Pt ,Pд)
E(x,y)∼γ [∥x − y∥] (13)
Here, Π
(
Pt ,Pд
)
denotes the set of all joint distributions γ for
which Pt and Pд are marginals. Unfortunately, computing the in-
fimum in Eqn 13 is intractable as it involves searching through
the space of all possible joint distributions γ . Instead, Arjovsky et
al. [2] derive an alternate formulation to measure the Wasserstein
distance using Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality as shown in Eqn. 14.
W (PT ,PG ) = sup
∥f ∥L ≤1
Ex∼PT [f (x)] − Ex∼PG [f (x)] (14)
Here the supremum is taken over all 1-Lipschitz continuous
functions f . To find a function f that satisfies Eqn 14, the authors
consider a parameterizable critic function Dw : X → R. The param-
etersw of the critic function are chosen by solving the optimization
problem shown in Eqn 15.
W (PT ,PG ) = maxw Ex∼PT [Dw (x)] − Ez∼N(0, I ) [Dw (G(z))] (15)
Thus, in order to generate realistic synthetic examples that are
close to the target distribution, G is trained to minimize the es-
timate of Wasserstein Distance in Eqn 15. This can be achieved
by maximizing the value of the critic function for the generator’s
examples using the loss function shown in Eqn 16. D is trained to
solve the optimization problem in Eqn 15 by using the loss function
in Eqn 17.
z ∼N(0, I ); x ∼ {xi }ni=1
LG = −Dw (G(z)) (16)
LD = Dw (G(z)) − Dw (x) (17)
To ensure that D is K-Lipschitz continuous, the original WGAN
paper proposedweight clipping. A later work by Gulrajani et al. [13]
proposed using gradient penalty to improve the stability of training,
which we adopt in our proposal.
5.2 Incorporating WGAN in MAZE
We describe the modifications to the training algorithm of MAZE
(Algorithm. 1) that are necessary to incorporate WGAN training in
the partial-data setting. In addition to the generator (G) and clone
(C) models, we define a critic model D to estimate the Wasserstein
distance. We modify the original loss function ofG (Eqn 7) with an
additional term as shown in Eqn 18.
x = G(z) : z ∼ N(0, I )
LG = −DKL(T (x)∥C(x)) − λD(x) (18)
The first term in Eqn 18 represents the disagreement loss from
MAZE and the second term is theWGAN loss. The hyper-parameter
λ balances the relative importance between these two losses. To
train the critic model D, we add an extra training phase (described
by Algorithm 2) to our original training algorithm. This involves
training the critic model for Nd iterations to update its weights
to maximize the objective function described in Eqn 15. We also
include a gradient penalty term GP = (∥∇xD(x)∥2 − 1)2 in LD to
ensure that D is 1-Lipschitz continuous.
Algorithm 2: Critic Training
// Critic Training
for i ← 0 to Nd do
z ∼ N(0, I );x ∼ {xi }ni=1LD = D(G(z)) − D(x) +GP
θD ← θD − ηD∇θDLD
end
The training loops for the clone training and experience replay in
Algorithm 1 remain unchanged. Using these modifications we can
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Figure 7: Normalized clone accuracy ofMAZE (data-free), MAZE-PD (partial-data), and JBDA (partial-data) as the query budget
is varied. Our results show that for a given query budget, MAZE-PD can train a clone model with higher accuracy than MAZE.
The accuracy of MAZE-PD is also significantly better than the JBDA attack.
train a generator model that produces inputs closer to the target
distribution PT . These inputs are more effective in carrying out the
task of model stealing and help improve the query efficiency of our
attack. Thus, the availability of a few samples from the training
data allows MAZE-PD to not only obtain higher accuracy but also
to orchestrate a faster attack. We provide experimental results for
MAZE-PD in the next subsection.
5.3 Results: Clone Accuracy with Partial Data
We repeat the model stealing attack using MAZE-PD in the par-
tial data setting. We assume that the attacker now has access to
100 random examples from the training data of the target model,
which is roughly 0.2% of the total training data used to train the
target model. We use λ = 10 in Eqn 18 and Nd = 10 in Algo-
rithm 2. Note that critic training does not require extra queries to
the target model. The rest of the parameters are kept the same as
before. We carry out the attack for 7 different query budgets Q ∈
{0.625M, 1.25M, 2.5M, 5M, 10M, 20M, 30M}. Fig 7 shows the nor-
malized clone accuracy obtained with MAZE-PD and MAZE (data-
free). For a given query budget, MAZE-PD obtains a higher clone
accuracy compared to MAZE. Furthermore, MAZE-PD reaches
near-perfect clone accuracy (0.97×-1.0×).
Comparison with JBDA: Additionally, we compare MAZE-PD
with JBDA, which also operates in the partial-data setting. We
report results using 100 seed examples derived from the training
dataset for the JBDA attack. We find that the clone models obtained
from JBDA have low accuracy for most datasets (less than 0.30×
for SVHN, GTSRB, and CIFAR-10). In contrast, MAZE-PD obtains
highly accurate clone models (0.97×-1.0×) across all four datasets.
5.4 Impact on Query Budget
To understand the reduction in query budget with MAZE-PD, we
compare the query budget necessary to reach a minimum normal-
ized clone accuracy of 0.90× between MAZE-PD and MAZE in
Table 4. Our results show that MAZE-PD offers a reduction of 2×
to 24× in the query budget compared to MAZE. While we see a
considerable reduction in query budget with just 100 examples, we
expect this to reduce further with more training examples.
Table 4: Comparison of query budgets needed to reach a nor-
malized clone accuracy of 0.90× with MAZE-PD and MAZE.
MAZE-PD reduces the query budget by up to 24×.
Target Models MAZE MAZE-PD Reduction
FashionMNIST >30 M 2.5 M >12×
SVHN 1.25 M 0.675 M 2×
GTSRB 30 M 1.25 M 24×
CIFAR-10 30 M 10 M 3×
5.5 Comparing Synthetic Images Generated by
MAZE and MAZE-PD
Both MAZE and MAZE-PD use a generator to create synthetic
images that are used to query the target model. MAZE produces
these images without relying on any input data from the target
model. On the other hand, MAZE-PD aims to use the available data
to encourage the distribution of images produces by the generator
PG to be closer to the target distribution PT using theWGAN loss to
train the generator. Thus, MAZE-PD is expected to produce visually
closer images to the distribution of the target model, and this is the
reason for the increased accuracy and speed of MAZE-PD.
To better understand the quality of the images created by MAZE-
PD we compare a small number of representative images that are
produced by MAZE-PD with MAZE. Fig 8 shows four images pro-
duced by MAZE and MAZE-PD. We also show four representative
images from the corresponding dataset. It can be seen that the
images produced by MAZE-PD are visually similar to the images
from the target distribution. For example, for FashionMNIST, the
synthetic image produced by MAZE-PD resembles a garment. For
GTSRB, it resembles a traffic sign. For SVHN, it resembles the num-
ber "8". And, for CIFAR-10, it resembles an automobile.
Furthermore, we can see a clear distinction between the fore-
ground and the background for the images produced by MAZE-PD.
However, such separation of foreground and background is absent
in the synthetic images produced by MAZE. Thus, using theWGAN
objective in the training of the GAN encourages the generator to
produce synthetic images that are closer to the target distribution,
likely resulting in MAZE-PD generating clones with higher accu-
racy using fewer queries.
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Figure 8: Comparing images produced by the generative models for (a) MAZE and (b) MAZE-PD with (c) actual training data.
MAZE-PD produces images that are visually similar to the target distribution by including the WGAN objective to train the
generative model, leading to an improvement in query efficiency over MAZE.
6 RELATEDWORK
We summarize the related work in model stealing and contrast
our proposed attack with prior research in this field. Additionally,
as our work is closely related to Data-Free Knowledge Distillation,
we describe two recent works and explain why they cannot be used
to perform model stealing. Finally, we describe the related works
in adversarial machine learning that also leverage zeroth-order
optimization techniques.
6.1 Model Stealing Attacks
Prior works on MS attacks typically rely on the availability of data
in some form to query the target model. KnockoffNets [28] assumes
that the adversary has access to a suitable surrogate dataset that
is similar to the data distribution of the target model. JBDA [30]
is another attack that assumes partial access to the data used to
train the target model. This attack crafts synthetic examples from
the available data that can be used to query the target model as
explained in Section 2.1.
In the data-free setting, prior works have only investigatedmodel
stealing in a restricted setup where the attacker has some prior
knowledge of the model architecture or the model complexity is
limited. Roberts et al. [32] investigate using inputs sampled from
noise distributions to query the target model to perform model
stealing on simple CNNs trained on MNIST and KMNIST. Tramer
et al. [36] propose using equation solving to determine the exact
model parameters when the model architecture is known. However,
these methods do not scale to more complex models and datasets.
To the best of our knowledge, MAZE is the first attack that can be
used to train high accuracy clone models (0.91 − 0.99× normalized
clone accuracy) on complex DNNmodels trained for multiple image
classification tasks. Furthermore, we show that if a small number
of examples are available from the distribution of the target model,
then our attack can become even more accurate and faster in such
a partial-data setting.
6.2 Data-Free Knowledge Distillation
We discuss two recent works on data-free KD that are closely related
to our proposal and also explain why these works cannot be used
directly to perform model stealing as they require white-box access
to the target model.
Adversarial BeliefMatching (ABM) [24]:ABMperforms knowl-
edge distillation by using images generated from a generative model
G(z;ϕ). This generative model is trained to produce inputs x such
that the predictions of the teacher model T (X ;θT ) and the predic-
tions of the student model S(x ;θS ) are dissimilar. Specifically, G is
trained to maximize the KL-divergence between the predictions of
the teacher and student model using the loss function shown in
Eqn. 20. The student model, on the other hand, is trained to match
the predictions of the teacher by minimizing the KL-divergence be-
tween the predictions of T and S using the loss function in Eqn. 21.
By iteratively updating the generator and student model, ABM
performs knowledge distillation between T and S .
x = G(z) (19)
LG = −DKL (T (x) ∥ S (x)) (20)
LS = DKL (T (x) ∥ S (x)) (21)
In addition to the basic idea presented above, ABM also uses an
additional Attention Transfer [43] term in the loss function of the
student. AT tries to match the attention maps of the intermediate
activations between the student and teacher networks.
The training process of the generator model in ABM assumes
white-box access to the target model as the loss function of G
(Eqn. 20) requires backpropagating through the target model T .
Moreover, ABM also uses AT, which requires access to the interme-
diate activations of T . Due to these requirements, ABM cannot be
directly used in the black-box setting of model stealing attacks.
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Dreaming To Distill (DTD) [41]: Given a DNN model T and a
target classy, DTD proposes to use the loss function ofT along with
various image-prior terms to generate realistic images that resemble
the images from the target class in the training distribution of T by
framing it as an optimization problem as shown in Eqn. 22.
min
x
L(T (x),y)) + Rp (x) (22)
In this equation, Rp is the image prior regularization term which
steers the synthetic image x away from unnatural images. The
key insight of DTD is that the statistics of the batch norm layers
(channel-wise mean and variance information of the activation
maps for the training data) can be used to construct an image prior
term that helps craft realistic inputs by performing the optimiza-
tion in Eqn. 22 . In the knowledge distillation setting, the inputs
generated using this technique can be used to train a student model
S from the predictions of the teacher model T .
Note that, much like ABM, DTD also requires white-box access
to the target model since the optimization problem in Eqn. 22 re-
quires backpropagating through the teacher model. Furthermore,
this work requires us to know the running mean and variance in-
formation stored in the batch norm layer, which is unavailable in
the black-box setting of the model stealing attack.
6.3 ZO Gradient Estimation in Adversarial ML
Zeroth-order gradient estimation is a commonly used technique to
solve black-box optimization problems where the gradient informa-
tion is unavailable. In adversarial machine learning, this technique
has been used to craft adversarial examples in the black-box set-
ting [1, 5, 38]. The goal of adversarial attacks is to cause misclassi-
fication by adding targeted perturbations to an input. E.g. given an
input x , that belongs to classy and a target modelT , we want to find
a perturbation δ such that the perturbed input x ′ = x + δ causes a
misclassification in the target model such that T (x ′) , y. In black-
box settings, several attacks use zeroth-order gradient estimates to
iteratively perturb x in order to find an adversarial example x ′ that
results in a misclassification.
Note that these attacks require an input from the target distribu-
tion that produces correct output and apply zeroth-order gradient
estimation to transform this valid image to a malicious image that
produces incorrect output, whereas, MAZE uses zeroth-order gra-
dient estimation to train a generator without any data so that this
generator can produce synthetic inputs to facilitate cloning.
7 DEFENDING AGAINST MAZE
MAZE is the first data-free model stealing attack that can effectively
produce high accuracy clone models for multiple vision-based DNN
models. Several recent works have been proposed to defend against
model stealing attacks.We discuss the applicability of these defenses
against our attack and explain their limitations.
MAZE requires access to the prediction probabilities ofT in order
to estimate gradient information. Thus, a natural way to defend
against it would be to limit access to the predictions of the model to
the end-user by restricting the output of the model only to provide
hard-labels. Such a defense would make it harder, although not
necessarily impossible, for an adversary to estimate the gradient by
using numerical methods [4, 6, 17]. Unfortunately, such a defense
may limit benign users from using the prediction probabilities from
the service for downstream processing tasks.
Another potential method to defend against MAZE is to pre-
vent an adversary from accessing the true predictions of the model
by perturbing the output probabilities with some noise. Several
defenses have been proposed along these lines [19, 21, 29]. Unfortu-
nately, a key shortcoming of such a perturbation-based defense is
that it can destroy information contained in the class probabilities
that can be important for a benign user of the service for down-
stream processing tasks. Furthermore, such a defense can reduce
classification accuracy for benign users, which is undesirable.
Yet another way to reduce the effectiveness of our attack may
be to limit the number of queries that each user can make to the
service. However, an adversary could circumvent such a defense by
launching a distributed attack where the task of attacking the model
is split across multiple users. Furthermore, limiting the number
of queries may also constrain some of the legitimate users of the
service frommaking benign queries, which may also be undesirable.
8 CONCLUSION
Commercially available machine learning models are often trained
with significant resources and proprietary data, and are considered
valuable intellectual property. Model Stealing (MS) attacks can allow
the users of such proprietary models to copy the functionality of
these models to a clone model. The efficacy of current MS attacks is
heavily reliant on the availability of data from the target distribution
or a representative distribution.
In this paper, we developMAZE, a highly accurate MS attack that
can be launched without any input data. To the best of our knowl-
edge,MAZE is the first data-freeMS attack that works effectively for
complex DNN models trained across multiple image-classification
tasks. MAZE uses a generator trained with zeroth-order optimiza-
tion to craft synthetic inputs, which are then used to copy the func-
tionality of the target model to the clone model. Our evaluations,
with four datasets and complex models, show that MAZE produces
clone models with high classification accuracy (0.91× to 0.99×). De-
spite not using any data, MAZE provides even higher accuracy than
the recent attacks that rely on partial-data or surrogate-data. Thus,
MAZE not only allows the attacker to launch the attack without
data but also have higher accuracy for the attack.
In addition, we proposeMAZE-PD to extend MAZE to the partial-
data setting, where the adversary has access to a small number of
examples from the target distribution. MAZE-PD uses generative
adversarial training to produce inputs that are closer to the target
distribution. This further improves accuracy (0.97× to 1.0×) and
yields a significant reduction in the number of queries (2× to 24×)
necessary to carry out the attack compared to MAZE.
Our work presents an important step towards developing highly
accurate data-free model-stealing attack that works across multiple
vision datasets. We hope that it serves as a baseline for future
works to develop more efficient model stealing attacks in the data-
free setting. Furthermore, while we develop and evaluate MAZE
in the setting of model-stealing attacks, MAZE is a generalized
framework, which enables knowledge distillation in the black-box
setting, without requiring any input data.
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